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Abstract
I study the identification of time preferences in dynamic discrete choice
models. Time preferences play a crucial role in these models, as they af-
fect inference and counterfactual analysis. Previous literature has shown that
observed choice probabilities do not identify the exponential discount factor
in general. Recent identification results rely on specific forms of exogenous
variation that impact transition probabilities but not instantaneous utilities.
Although such variation allows for set identification of the respective param-
eter, point identification is only achieved in limited cases. To circumvent
this shortcoming, I focus on models in which economic decision-makers might
be restricted in their choice sets. I show that time preferences can be iden-
tified provided that there is variation in the probability of being restricted
that does not affect utilities or transition probabilities. The derived exclusion
restrictions are easy to interpret and potentially fulfilled in many empirical
applications.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are used to estimate the behaviour of economic
agents and analyse counterfactual policies in numerous fields.1 The discount factor
is crucial in these models, as it determines the reactions to expected future events.
In empirical applications, researchers are often forced to set the discount factor, as
it cannot be identified from observed probabilities without further restrictions (see
Magnac & Thesmar, 2002; Rust, 1994). Time preferences appear to be stable over
time (Meier & Sprenger, 2015) but vary substantially across contexts and popula-
tions (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Thus, setting the discount
factor to a predetermined value can lead to incorrect inference and misleading coun-
terfactual analysis. Recent literature (Abbring & Daljord, 2020b; Fang & Wang,
2015) on the identification of time preferences has focused on variation in transition
probabilities but is only able to point identify the discount factor in limited cases.2
This paper provides a new class of instruments – changes in probabilistic choice
restrictions – to point identify the discount factor. A choice restriction occurs when
economic agents are not able to choose from all potential alternatives. Examples of
such restrictions are common. In labor economics, individuals can be restricted in
their choices: When individuals are unemployed, they need to receive a job offer to
be able to choose a positive number of working hours. In industrial organizations,
choices might be restricted when mergers are subject to approval. In marketing, the
availability of products might be restricted when products are no longer sold or out
of stock. In environmental economics, the amount of emissions a firm can produce
in a given period might be restricted with uncertainty stemming from changes in
environmental regulations.
1Keane and Wolpin (2009) provide an overview of these fields. Recent examples include Blun-
dell, Costas-Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2016) in labor economics, Miravete and Palacios-Huerta
(2014) in industrial organizations, De Groote and Verboven (2019) in environmental economics,
and Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang (2018) in marketing.
2Although Fang and Wang (2015) claim to generically identify various parameters related to
time preferences, Abbring and Daljord (2020a) show that their proposed exclusion restriction is
not sufficient for identification.
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I show that exogenous variation in the probability of being restricted in one’s
choice directly point identifies the discount factor of dynamic discrete choice mod-
els. Identification is achieved without requiring the normalization of one alterna-
tive’s utility. Although this is a standard approach in empirical applications, it
can lead to misleading counterfactual policy simulations in some cases (see, e.g.,
Kalouptsidi, Scott, & Souza-Rodrigues, 2019; Norets & Tang, 2014). Furthermore,
the identification approach does not require that models are stationary. In contrast
to Magnac and Thesmar (2002), my proposed exclusion restriction is formulated on
instantaneous utilities and does not rely on future value functions. This simplifies
the interpretation and makes it easier to find variables that satisfy the exclusion
restriction in empirical applications.
Exploiting variation in choice restrictions also overcomes the issue of set identifi-
cation of previous proposed exclusion restrictions (as in Abbring & Daljord, 2020b)
by directly point identifying the discount factor. The derived formulas for the expo-
nential discount factor are easy to interpret and align with economic intuition. For
finite horizon models, time preferences can also be identified in short panels and for
models in which the reachable part of the state space changes over time.
Dynamic discrete choice models that include probabilistic choice restrictions nest
the standard dynamic discrete choice models as discussed by Magnac and Thesmar
(2002) or Abbring and Daljord (2020b). Standard models limit the probabilities to
be restricted to zero in all cases. The framework presented here also permits the
probability of being restricted in the future to be either one or zero. Thus, settings
where choice sets vary non-stochastically depending on previous choices are nested.
The vast majority of dynamic discrete choice models can be easily adjusted to
include choice restrictions. One possibility of a minimal adjustment is the following:
In principle, choices are never restricted, and economic agents can always choose
from all alternatives. To identify the exponential discount factor in such settings, it
is sufficient that a state exists that provides the same utility and the same transition
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probabilities as another state. This state must then lead to a choice set that is
reduced by at least one alternative.
Consequently, it is easy to adjust the vast majority of dynamic discrete choice
models in such a way that the exclusion restriction is fulfilled. For instance, in the
classic bus-engine replacement example of Rust (1987), the following adjustments
lead to the identification of the exponential discount factor. Assume that one bus
engine is in stock. Once a bus engine is replaced, Harald Zurcher has to order a new
engine. A restriction is present if there are random strikes or other reasons that a
new bus engine cannot be delivered immediately. As a result, Harold Zurcher no
longer has the option to replace a bus engine in two periods in a row. This variation
would be sufficient to point identify the exponential discount factor in this model
since it neither affects the transition probabilities of the buses’ mileage nor Harold
Zurcher’s instantaneous utilities.
In most other contexts, it is also possible to find potential restrictions that permit
point identification of time preferences. Models in labor economics often include
choice restrictions in the form of job offers (see, for example, Adda, Dustmann, &
Stevens, 2017). When explaining home buying choices for different neighbourhoods
(see, for example Bayer, McMillan, Murphy, & Timmins, 2016), the availability of
homes in some neighbourhoods might be restricted. Exogenous variation in this
availability can be sufficient for the identification of households’ time preferences.
For De Groote and Verboven (2019), who study the adoption of solar photovoltaic
systems, the availability of specific systems might vary due to strikes or supplier
shortages. Such exogenous variation can then be exploited to identify discount
functions.
The literature on the identification of dynamic discrete choice models (e.g., Ab-
bring, 2010; Arcidiacono & Miller, 2020; Chen, 2017; Hu & Sasaki, 2018; Srisuma,
2015) has discussed various aspects of these models, with only a few papers provid-
ing conditions to identify time preferences. The identification of time preferences is
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pivotal for the identification of alternative-specific utilities. Magnac and Thesmar
(2002) demonstrate that it is not possible to identify utilities if the discount factor
is not known. Conversely, once the discount factor is identified and given the distri-
bution of preference shocks and the normalization of one utility, all other utilities
can be uniquely determined.3
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) are among the first to examine how the exponential
discount factor can be recovered from observed choices. Their derived exclusion
restriction requires two states that have different expected streams of utilities for
some choices but equal expected streams of utilities for at least one choice. The states
should also provide the same instantaneous utilities. The requirements on future
expected utility streams increase the difficulty of finding such states in empirical
applications.
Abbring and Daljord (2020b) extend the identification approach of Magnac and
Thesmar (2002). They develop an exclusion restriction on instantaneous utilities,
avoiding requirements on future utility streams. Their exclusion restriction requires
two states that have equal instantaneous utilities but different transition probabili-
ties. The identifying equation includes an infinite geometric sum in the exponential
discount factor. As a result, time preferences are only set identified. Excluding
discount factors that are close to one, the set consists of a finite number of discount
factors. Abbring and Daljord (2020b) discuss several examples that allow for a re-
duction in the number of potential solutions, for example, by relying on the concept
of finite dependence (see Arcidiacono & Miller, 2019).
Overall, variations in transition probabilities only lead to point identification
if at least one additional requirement is met. Abbring and Daljord (2020b) also
have to rely on the normalization of one alternative’s utility. The exclusion restric-
tion proposed in this paper overcomes these issues and directly point identifies the
exponential discount factor.
3This identification result carries over to the setting with choice restrictions and is discussed in
section 5.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the
general model. Sections 3 and 4 discuss identification in infinite and finite horizon
models, respectively. Section 5 provides sufficient conditions to identify instanta-
neous utilities once time preferences are identified. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In each period t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, where T is either finite or infinite, each agent has
to choose an alternative from a finite set of alternatives. The set of alternatives is
denoted by D and contains K elements. With some probability, agents are forced
to choose an alternative from a subset of D, i.e., from a restricted choice set. The
restricted choice set that agents might face in a given period depends on the alter-
native d chosen in the previous period. Restricted choice sets are denoted by D̃ (d).
The probability that agents have to choose from D̃ (d) instead of D depends on d
and the state x ∈ X in the previous period, where X contains a finite number of J
elements. In particular, if the state is currently x and agents choose d, then in the
next period, they have to choose from D̃ (d) with probability π (d, x) and can choose
from D with probability 1− π (d, x). The probabilities π (d, x) are called restriction
probabilities.4 I assume that π (d, x) > 0 for at least one pair (d, x) ∈ D × X .
Choosing alternative d, given state x, provides agents with the instantaneous
utility u⋆ (d, x, ηd), where ηd denotes an alternative-specific preference shock. Pref-
erence shocks are assumed to be mean-zero type-1 extreme value distributed and
are assumed to be independent over all d ∈ D and all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.5 It is as-
sumed that instantaneous utility is additively separable in the preference shock,
4Note that these restrictions are not the same as those discussed in McFadden (1978). The
probabilistic choice restrictions in McFadden (1978) are introduced to reduce the computational
burden for the researcher in problems with a vast number of alternatives. Restricted choice sets
should also not be interpreted as consideration sets, as for instance, in Shocker, Ben-Akiva, Boccara,
and Nedungadi (1991) or Goeree (2008). Consideration sets exclude alternatives that agents are
not aware of and thus do not consider. This paper assumes that agents are fully aware of potential
restrictions and can base their decisions on future probabilities to be restricted.
5The results extend to any other continuous distribution.
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i.e., u⋆ (d, x, ηd) = u (d, x) + ηd. The vector η = {η1, . . . , ηK} contains the preference
shocks related to all alternatives.
The probability of observing a certain state xt in period t depends on both the
choice dt−1 and the state xt−1 in period t − 1. In particular, state xt occurs with
the transition probability q (xt ∣dt−1, xt−1 ). It is assumed that transition probabil-
ities (and restriction probabilities) do not depend on preference shocks ηt. This
assumption is one variant of the conditional independence assumption (see Rust,
1987).
The order of events in each period t is the following. First, the choice set is
determined, and agents observe the state xt and preference shocks ηt. Second, agents
choose one alternative dt. Finally, agents collect instantaneous utility u⋆ (dt, xt, ηdt,t),
and the period ends.
In period t, agents maximize their total expected discounted stream of instanta-
neous utilities v⋆ (dt, xt, ηdt,t). The additive separability of u (dt, xt) and the condi-
tional independence assumption imply v⋆ (dt, xt, ηdt,t) = v (dt, xt) + ηdt,t, with
v (dt, xt) = u(dt, xt)
+ β ∑
xt+1
∈X
[ (1 − π (dt, xt))E [max
j∈D
{v (j, xt+1) + ηj,t+1}]
+ π (dt, xt)E [ max
j∈D̃(dt)
{v (j, xt+1) + ηj,t+1}] ]q (xt+1 ∣dt, xt ) ,
(1)
where β denotes the discount factor. Under the assumption made about the distri-
bution of the preference shocks, (1) can be expressed as
v (dt, xt) = u(dt, xt)
+ β ∑
xt+1
∈X
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1 − π (dt, xt)) ln(∑
j∈D
exp (v (j, xt+1)))
+ π (dt, xt) ln⎛⎝ ∑
j∈D̃(dt)
exp (v (j, xt+1))⎞⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
q (xt+1 ∣dt, xt ) .
(2)
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Further discussion distinguishes between observed and genuine choice probabil-
ities. The observed choice probabilities describe the probability that agents choose
alternative dt given the current period’s state xt and the choice dt−1 and state xt−1
in period t − 1. They reflect a combination of preferences and possible choice re-
strictions. The observed choice probabilities are denoted by Pr (dt ∣xt, dt−1, xt−1 ).
Genuine choice probabilities describe the probability that agents choose alternative
dt from a specific choice set Dˆ ∈ {D, D̃ (dt−1) ;dt−1 ∈ D}, given state xt. They exclu-
sively reflect preferences over the alternatives included in the respective choice set.
Genuine choice probabilities are denoted by GPr (dt ∣Dˆ, xt ).
I concentrate on the identification of the time preference parameter β in (2)
because it is essential to the identification of the model.6 Suppose that data are
available, such that all transition, restriction, and genuine choice probabilities can
be derived. Then, the model is point identified if and only if utilities can be uniquely
determined from these probabilities. As discussed in section 5, an adapted version
of Proposition 2 of Magnac and Thesmar (2002) is fulfilled: Given the distribution
of preference shocks and the normalization of one alternative’s utility, all other
utilities depend on the discount factor β. Thus, without knowing β, utilities cannot
be uniquely determined, and the model is not identified.
The presented model is closely related to the dynamic discrete choice model
discussed by Magnac and Thesmar (2002). The key difference between the two
frameworks is that Magnac and Thesmar (2002) limits all restriction probabilities
to zero. I highlight two potential paths to minimally adjust the standard model
to fit the discussed framework. One potential adjustment introduces a non-zero re-
striction probability for exactly one choice-state combination. The respective choice
set includes all but one alternative of D. Another potential adjustment makes an
additional alternative available after one choice-state combination. To do so, it is
assumed that all restriction probabilities are equal to one except for one choice-state
6Note that I focus on infinite-horizon models and finite-horizon models, for which the last period
cannot be used to identify instantaneous utilities.
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combination. All restricted choice sets exclude the same single alternative. Note
that in addition to these two paths, restriction probabilities can be limited to ei-
ther equal one or zero. Thus, the presented framework also allows for settings with
deterministic changes in the set of alternatives.
For ease of exposition, I drop the subscript t henceforth and denote variables for
period t + 1 with a prime. The following sections also assume that restriction and
genuine choice probabilities are known. Appendix A discusses the identification of
restriction probabilities when these cannot be recovered from other data sources.
Appendix B discusses the identification of genuine choice probabilities.
3 Infinite horizon
I assume that the data {GPr (d ∣D, x), q (⋅ ∣d, x), π (d, x); (d, x) ∈ D ×X} are known
for at least two consecutive periods. Note that the genuine choice probabilities
conditioned on choice set D identify the genuine choice probabilities conditioned on
any restricted choice set D̃ (⋅).7 I do not make any assumptions about stationarity.
Fix n′ ∈ D. Subtract the value function v (n′, x′) from both terms within the
square brackets of (2), and add it once to neutralize the subtraction. As a result,
the following can be derived:
v (d, x) = u (d, x) + β ∑
x′∈X
[ (1 − π (d, x))m (D, n′, x′)
+ π (d, x)m (D̃ (d) , n′, x′) + v (n′, x′) ]q (x′∣d, x) ,
(3)
where m (Dˆ, n′, x′) = ln (∑j∈Dˆ exp (v (j, x′)) (exp (v (n′, x′)))−1) for a given choice set
Dˆ ∈ {D, D̃ (d) ;d ∈ D}. Eachm (⋅, ⋅, ⋅) can be directly recovered from a transformation
of the respective genuine choice probability
m (Dˆ, n′, x′) = − ln (GPr (n′ ∣Dˆ, x′ )) ,
7For details, see appendix B.
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as long as n′ ∈ Dˆ (see Arcidiacono & Miller, 2011). If n′ ∉ Dˆ, the assumption of
the independence of irrelevant alternatives can be exploited, and m (Dˆ, n′, x′) is
identified by
m (Dˆ, n′, x′) = ln(∑j∈DˆGPr (j ∣D, x′ )
GPr (n′ ∣D, x′ ) ) .
Let m (Dˆ, n′), q (d, x) and v (n′) denote vectors of size J × 1, for which the j-th
element is m (Dˆ, n′, xj), q (xj ∣d, x) and v (n′, xj), respectively. Using this notation,
(3) can be expressed as
v (d, x) = u (d, x) + β[(1 − π (d, x))q (d, x)⊺m (D, n′)
+ π (d, x)q (d, x)⊺m (D̃ (d) , n′) + q (d, x)⊺v (n′)], (4)
where the superscript ⊺ denotes the transpose.
Hotz and Miller (1993) show that for a given state x, the difference between
the value functions of two alternatives can be identified using a function of their
choice probabilities. For the presented model, the difference in the logarithms of
the genuine choice probabilities of two alternatives ℓ, r ∈ D determines the difference
between their value functions:
ln (GPr (ℓ ∣D, x)) − ln (GPr (r ∣D, x)) = v (ℓ, x) − v (r, x) . (5)
By combining (4) and (5), the following can be derived:
ln (GPr (ℓ ∣D, x)) − ln (GPr (r ∣D, x)) = u (ℓ, x) − u (r, x)
+ β[ (1 − π (ℓ, x))q (ℓ, x)⊺m (D, n′) + π (ℓ, x)q (ℓ, x)⊺m (D̃ (ℓ) , n′)
− (1 − π (r, x))q (r, x)⊺m (D, n′) − π (r, x)q (r, x)⊺m (D̃ (r) , n′)
+ (q (ℓ, x) − q (r, x))⊺v (n′) ].
(6)
Many elements in (6) are identified. The remaining unknown elements are β,
the difference in instantaneous utilities between the two alternatives ℓ and r, and
9
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the value functions of alternative n′. Based on this observation, I formulate the
following exclusion restriction:
Exclusion Restriction. There exist two different states xA, xB ∈ X and two differ-
ent alternatives ℓ, r ∈ D, such that
(1) u (ℓ, xA) = u (ℓ, xB) and u (r, xA) = u (r, xB);
(2) q (x ∣d, xA ) = q (x ∣d, xB ) for d ∈ {ℓ, r}, and x ∈ X ;
(3) π (ℓ, xA) < π (ℓ, xB).
The exclusion restriction is formulated for two states and two alternatives that
must fulfil three conditions. First, each alternative must provide the same instanta-
neous utility for both states. Second, for each alternative, the transition probabilities
must be equal for both states. Third, for at least one alternative, the restriction
probabilities must differ between the two states.
Assume that the exclusion restriction is fulfilled for states xA, xB ∈ X and alter-
natives ℓ, r ∈ D. Subtracting (6) using x = xB from the same equation using x = xA
results in
ln(GPr (ℓ ∣D, xA )
GPr (ℓ ∣D, xB )) − ln(
GPr (r ∣D, xA )
GPr (r ∣D, xB )) =
β[ (π (ℓ, xB) − π (ℓ, xA))q (ℓ, xA)⊺Θ (ℓ)
− (π (r, xB) − π (r, xA))q (r, xA)⊺Θ (r) ],
(7)
where Θ (d) = m (D, n′) −m (D̃ (d) , n′). Note that the j-th element of Θ (d) is
given by
ln(1 + ∑k∈D/D̃(d) exp (v (k, xj))∑k∈D̃(d) exp (v (k, xj)) ) ,
and is independent of alternative n′. For the identification of the time preference
parameter β, the following rank condition is required.
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Rank Condition.
(π (ℓ, xB)−π (ℓ, xA))q (ℓ, xA)⊺Θ (ℓ)−(π (r, xB)−π (r, xA))q (r, xA)⊺Θ (r)≠0. (8)
Assuming that rank condition (8) is fulfilled, β is point identified by
β = ln (
GPr(ℓ∣D,xA )
GPr(ℓ∣D,xB )) − ln (GPr(r∣D,xA )GPr(r∣D,xB ))
(π (ℓ, xB)−π (ℓ, xA))q (ℓ, xA)⊺Θ (ℓ)−(π (r, xB)−π (r, xA))q (r, xA)⊺Θ (r) . (9)
If the ratios of the genuine choice probabilities of ℓ and r are identical for both states,
the numerator on the right-hand side of (9) equals zero. As a result, the discount
factor β also equals zero. Intuitively, if agents’ choices do not differ, although they
lead to different expected futures, they do not place any value on future utilities
when choosing an alternative. They are myopic. Note that the rank condition (8)
guarantees that the expected futures for states xA and xB differ for choices ℓ and r.
For a more detailed discussion of (9), two exhaustive cases are distinguished.
Case 1. The restriction probabilities after choice ℓ ∈ D differ, such that π (ℓ, xA) <
π (ℓ, xB). Furthermore, there exists at least one other alternative r ∈ D that fulfils
conditions (1) and (2) of the exclusion restriction, for which the restriction proba-
bilities are equal for states xA and xB, i.e., π (r, xA) = π (r, xB).
For case 1, rank condition (8) simplifies to
q (ℓ, xA)⊺Θ (ℓ) ≠ 0. (10)
The sum in (10) consists exclusively of terms larger than or equal to zero. The
j-th value in Θ (ℓ) only becomes zero if none of the alternatives excluded from D̃ (ℓ)
provides any value other than negative infinity for the respective state. Thus, the
rank condition is violated if and only if there is no real restriction. As a result, rank
condition (10) is always fulfilled for correctly specified models.
11
Identification of Time Preferences Ulrich C. Schneider
In this case, (9) simplifies to8
β = ln (GPr (ℓ ∣D, xA )) − ln (GPr (ℓ ∣D, xB ))(π (ℓ, xB) − π (ℓ, xA))q (ℓ, xA)⊺Θ (ℓ) , (11)
and has a clear economic interpretation.
First, if the genuine choice probabilities of choosing ℓ ∈ D are equal for both
states, the right-hand side of (11) is zero. As a result, β is also zero, and agents
are myopic. This result has an economic meaning, as the rank condition guarantees
that there is a utility loss when restricted, while the exclusion restriction guarantees
that the probability of being restricted differs between states xA and xB. Thus, if
economic agents make the same decisions in both states, they ignore future conse-
quences.
Second, because π (ℓ, xB) > π (ℓ, xA) and because the left-hand side of (10) is
positive, the denominator on the right-hand side of (11) must be positive. For a
positive value of β, the numerator must also be positive. That is fulfilled if there is a
higher chance of choosing ℓ for state xA than state xB. The economic interpretation
is the following: Holding everything else equal, agents should prefer an option A
to an option B if option A results in a lower chance of being restricted in the next
period. In contrast, if agents prefer to be restricted in future periods, the discount
factor is negative. Thus, a negative value of β is only possible if the economic model
is violated.
Third, the size of β depends on the relation of three elements: the difference
in genuine choice probabilities, the difference in the restriction probabilities, and
the additional expected value of being able to choose freely. A greater difference in
the genuine choice probabilities coincides with a greater value of β when holding the
other two elements constant. Intuitively, the larger the reaction to a given difference
in restriction probabilities and a given difference in the expected future values, the
8Note that because utilities and transition and restriction probabilities are the same for xA and
x
B after choosing r, the logarithm of the ratio of their genuine choice probabilities equals zero.
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more weight agents place on their future. In contrast, the larger the difference in
the restriction probabilities, ceteris paribus, the lower β is. Intuitively, the greater
the probability difference of being restricted has to be to cause a fixed difference in
behaviour, the lower the weight agents place on their expected futures. Similarly, the
larger the expected surplus of not being restricted, holding everything else constant,
the lower β is. Intuitively, the larger the surplus of being able to choose freely has to
be to cause a fixed difference in behaviour, the weaker the influence of the expected
future is on current decisions.
Finally, note that (11) does not restrict β to be larger than 0 or lower than 1. A
negative β violates the economic meaning of the model and is only possible if agents
prefer to be restricted. In contrast, because no assumption about stationarity is
imposed, a β value above one does not necessarily violate the economic model.
Case 2. The restriction probabilities after choice ℓ ∈ D differ, such that π (ℓ, xA) <
π (ℓ, xB). Furthermore, there exists no other alternative r ∈ D that fulfils conditions
(1) and (2) of the exclusion restriction, for which restriction probabilities are equal
for states xA and xB. Thus, π (r, xA) ≠ π (r, xB).
For the discussion of the second case, an exhaustive division into three further
cases is helpful.
Case 2.a. π (ℓ, xB) − π (ℓ, xA) = π (r, xB) − π (r, xA).
For case 2.a, rank condition (8) simplifies to
(π (ℓ, xB) − π (ℓ, xA)) (q (ℓ, xA)⊺Θ (ℓ) − q (r, xA)⊺Θ (r)) ≠ 0. (12)
Rank condition (12) is fulfilled if the weighted surplus of not being restricted
after choosing alternative ℓ differs from that after choosing alternative r. If the
exclusion restriction is fulfilled for additional alternatives besides ℓ and r, it is only
necessary that one pair of alternatives exists for which the expected surpluses of not
being restricted differ.
13
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For case 2.a, (12) represents the denominator on the right-hand side of (9). If
the expected surplus of not being restricted after choosing ℓ is larger than that
after choosing r, the denominator will be positive. Given that economic agents are
less likely to be restricted in state xA, both logarithms of (9) should be positive.
This is fulfilled as long as individuals do not prefer to be restricted in their choice.
Otherwise, it would be a violation of the economic model. Further, if economic
agents gain more by not being restricted after choosing ℓ instead of r, the first
logarithm of the numerator of (9) should be greater than the second logarithm. As
a result, β has to be greater than zero.
In contrast, if the expected surplus of not being restricted after choosing ℓ is
lower than that after choosing r, the denominator will be negative. Arguing along
the same lines as before, the numerator of (9) should be negative as long as agents
do not prefer to be restricted. As a result, β is positive.
The size of β depends on the interaction of three elements: the difference in
the logarithms of the ratio of the genuine choice probabilities, the difference in the
restriction probabilities, and the difference in the weighted expected surplus between
alternatives ℓ and r when not restricted. Similar arguments as for case 1 can be
made to discuss the size of β.
Case 2.b. π (r, xA) > π (r, xB).
In this case, the denominator on the right-hand side of (9) is positive. Conse-
quently, β is positive if and only if the numerator on the right-hand side of (9) is
also positive. As long as individuals prefer not being restricted to being restricted,
the first term in the numerator of (9) is positive and the second term is negative,
guaranteeing a positive β.
The size of β is driven by multiple factors, which can be divided according to
whether they depend either ℓ or r. For elements depending on ℓ, the discussion of
case 1 applies when holding all elements depending on r constant. The elements
depending on r enter with a negative sign in the numerator and with a positive
14
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sign in the denominator of (9). Because π (r, xA) > π (r, xB), the genuine choice
probability of choice-state combination (r, xA) should be smaller than the genuine
choice probability of state-choice combination (r, xB). This is fulfilled as long as
individuals do not prefer to be restricted. As a consequence, the logarithm of the
ratio of the two genuine choice probabilities in (9) should be negative. This allows
us to apply the same discussion as for case 1 for the elements depending on r when
holding elements depending on ℓ constant.
Case 2.c. π (r, xB) > π (r, xA) and π (ℓ, xB) − π (ℓ, xA) ≠ π (r, xB) − π (r, xA).
In this case, the sign of the denominator on the right-hand side of (9) is ambigu-
ous. The sign of β depends on the different value functions for choices not included
in the two restricted choice sets. It also depends on the transition probabilities and
the relation of the restriction probabilities. A detailed discussion of all possible cases
is not productive without knowing the signs of most of these elements. With more
information on the different signs, similar arguments as before can be made.
3.1 Discussion
Restriction probabilities can be interpreted as external factors that only affect
agents’ choice sets. Thus, the requirements of the exclusion restriction are po-
tentially fulfilled in many empirical contexts. For instance, in the context of labor
supply, the job market might be hit by a negative demand shock, and the likeli-
hood of receiving a job offer decreases. Although such a shock affects the restriction
probabilities (i.e., the job offer probabilities), it does not affect the instantaneous
utilities or the transition probabilities. The instantaneous utilities depend on agents’
leisure and consumption trade-offs and should be unaffected by most labor demand
shocks. Similarly, the probabilities of transitioning from state to state should not
be affected, as for example, agents’ human capital develops independently of labor
15
Identification of Time Preferences Ulrich C. Schneider
demand shocks.9
In the context of firm entries into regulated markets, administrative variations
leading to different probabilities of the approval of mergers and acquisitions can lead
to the identification of time preferences. For identification, firms must time their
mergers due to administrative variations. Further, these variations are not allowed
to affect firms’ instantaneous utilities (or payoffs) and transition probabilities.
When estimating dynamic models of product demand, random shocks to the
supply of such products can identify the discount factor of consumers. For example,
if an exogenous shock affects the supply of one specific car brand, the probability
that certain car models are available changes. If consumers have the option to delay
the purchase of a car by one period until their preferred model becomes available
again, time preferences can be identified. Supply shocks should not affect consumers’
utilities from cars or their transition probabilities.
The exclusion restriction leads to point identification of the time preference pa-
rameter β as long as the rank condition is fulfilled. The rank condition is only
violated in rare cases: either alternatives that are excluded from restricted choice
sets are of no value for agents or there exist no two alternatives with different ex-
pected surpluses when choosing freely.
All identifying equations have a clear economic meaning. Nevertheless, the ex-
clusion restriction does not restrict β to be between zero and one. Negative values
are only possible if at least one model assumption is violated. Values above one are
possible without clear violations of the economic model, as no assumption about
stationarity is made.
9Note that the transition probabilities also determine the process of potential factors that only
affect restriction probabilities.
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4 Finite horizon
In finite-horizon models, the identification of β can potentially be achieved under
less restrictive assumptions, as the last period can be exploited for identification. If
the reachable part of the state space does not change over time, the genuine choice
probabilities in the last period can be used to identify all differences in instantaneous
utilities. Once the instantaneous utility of an arbitrary alternative is normalized, all
other instantaneous utilities are identified. Then, the discount factor can be point
identified using the genuine choice probabilities from the second-to-last period.
Relying on the exclusion restriction of the previous section, β can also be iden-
tified for models for which the data do not include the last period such as in short
panels. Furthermore, time preferences can be recovered for models in which the
reachable part of the state space changes over time. The discussion of the required
rank condition and the identifying equation carries over from the previous section,
as long as the current period t is part of the state space. This inclusion is necessary,
as all value functions are period specific and period t determines their distance to
the last period.
For the finite horizon model, the assumption of identical transition probabilities,
as stated in the exclusion restriction, can be relaxed. The non-stationary nature
allows for subsequent periods of different restriction probabilities as long as these do
not lead to different reachable state spaces. This allows for settings where different
groups of economic agents are differently restricted in their choices for a limited
number of periods.
In the labor context, this is the case when a randomly selected group of unem-
ployed individuals takes part in a program that supports job searchers in finding
jobs while another random group does not receive such support. The former group
should have greater job offer probabilities (i.e., lower restriction probabilities) than
the latter group.
To identify β in such settings, differences between the groups must be limited in
17
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time. Furthermore, the last period for which differences exist and the period after
that have to be observed. Time preferences can then be identified from these two
periods in the same fashion as in section 3.
In contrast, time preferences are not necessarily point identified if researchers
observe the data for two groups of economic agents that exclusively differ in their
restriction probabilities. To show this, let δ ∈ {A,B} denote a group indicator.
Restriction probabilities depend in this case not only on state-choice combinations
but also on the group indicator. I denote these by π (d, x, δ). Because of the different
restriction probabilities, value functions differ between the two groups. I denote
the vectors m (Dˆ, d) and v (d) by m (Dˆ, d, δ) and v (d, δ) for this demonstration,
where Dˆ ∈ {D, D̃ (d) ;d ∈ D}. Similarly, I denote the genuine choice probabilities by
GPr (d ∣Dˆ, x, δ ). In this case, (6) can be written as
ln(GPr (ℓ ∣D, x, δ )
GPr (r ∣D, x, δ )) = u (ℓ, x) − u (r, x)
+ βq (ℓ, x)⊺[ (1 − π (ℓ, x, δ))m (D, n′, δ) + π (ℓ, x, δ)m (D̃ (ℓ) , n′, δ)
+ v (n′, δ) ]
− βq (r, x)⊺[ (1 − π (r, x, δ))m (D, n′, δ) + π (r, x, δ)m (D̃ (r) , n′, δ)
+ v (n′, δ) ].
(13)
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Taking the difference of (13) between the two groups A and B results in
ln(GPr (ℓ ∣D, x,A)
GPr (r ∣D, x,A)) − ln(
GPr (ℓ ∣D, x,B )
GPr (r ∣D, x,B )) =
βq (ℓ, x)⊺[ (1 − π (ℓ, x,A))m (D, n′,A)
+ π (ℓ, x,A)m (D̃ (ℓ) , n′,A) − (1 − π (ℓ, x,B))m (D, n′,B)
− π (ℓ, x,B)m (D̃ (ℓ) , n′,B) + v (n′,A) − v (n′,B) ]
− βq (r, x)⊺[ (1 − π (r, x,A))m (D, n′,A)
+ π (r, x,A)m (D̃ (r) , n′,A) − (1 − π (r, x,B))m (D, n′,B)
− π (r, x,B)m (D̃ (r) , n′,B) + v (n′,A) − v (n′,B) ].
(14)
Similar to the infinite horizon framework, all m (Dˆ, n′, δ) can be identified from
the data. However, as future restrictions might differ, future value functions also
differ. Hence, the value functions for choice n′ do not cancel out between the two
groups. Consequently, changes in the genuine choice probabilities cannot recover β
because they might reflect differences in future values. Only when the differences in
value functions between the two groups are known can β be uniquely determined in
cases in which individuals only differ in their restriction probabilities.
5 Identification of instantaneous utilities
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show that in a stationary dynamic discrete choice
model with an infinite horizon and without choice restrictions, alternative specific
utilities are identified under the following conditions:
(1) The distribution of preference shocks η is known.
(2) The instantaneous utility of one alternative is normalized.
(3) The discount factor β is known.
19
Identification of Time Preferences Ulrich C. Schneider
This result does not necessarily carry over when restriction probabilities are non-
zero. Theorem 1 states a sufficient condition for the identification of instantaneous
utilities for a stationary dynamic discrete choice model with an infinite horizon and
at least one strictly positive restriction probability.
Theorem 1. Given the data {GPr (d ∣D, x), q (⋅ ∣d, x), π (d, x); (d, x) ∈ D ×X}, all
instantaneous utilities can be recovered under the following conditions:
(1) The distribution of preference shocks η is known.
(2) The instantaneous utility of one alternative is normalized.
(3) The discount factor β is known.
(4) There exists an alternative d ∈ D, such that d ∈ D̃ (d) or/and the assumption
of independence of irrelevant alternatives is fulfilled.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary d¯ ∈ D. Let Π (d) be the diagonal matrix with i-th diag-
onal entry π (d, xi). Let Q (d) denote a matrix with the {i, j}-th element being
q (xj ∣d, xi ). Finally, let IJ denote an identity matrix of size J . With this notation,
(3) can be rewritten for the full state space as
v (d¯) = u (d¯) + β[ (IJ −Π (d¯))Q (d¯)m (D, d¯)
+Π (d¯)Q (d¯)m (D̃ (d¯) , d¯) +Q (d¯)v (d¯) ].
Minor manipulation results in
v (d¯) = [IJ − βQ (d¯)]−1u (d¯)
+ [IJ − βQ (d¯)]−1 β[ (IJ −Π (d¯))Q (d¯)m (D, d¯)
+Π (d¯)Q (d¯)m (D̃ (d¯) , d¯) ].
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Note that the j-th element of m (Dˆ, d) with Dˆ ∈ {D, D̃ (d) ;d ∈ D} can be identi-
fied even if d ∉ D̃ (d) due to the assumption of irrelevant alternatives. With the
assumption that preference shocks are independently and identically distributed fol-
lowing a mean-zero type-I extreme value distribution, the j-th element of m (Dˆ, d)
is identified by10
m (Dˆ, d, xj) = ln(∑i∈DˆGPr (i ∣D, xj )
GPr (d ∣D, xj ) ) .
Given β and normalizing u (d¯) = 0 uniquely determines v (d¯). With v (d¯), all other
value functions are determined by a combination of the genuine choice probabili-
ties and v (d¯). For the assumption that η is the mean-zero type-I extreme value
distributed
v (d, x) = ln⎛⎝
GPr (d ∣D, x)
GPr (d¯ ∣D, x)
⎞
⎠ − v (d¯, x)
can be derived. Finally, utilities are uniquely determined by
u (d) = v (d) − β[ (IJ −Π (d))Q (d)m (D, d¯)
+Π (d)Q (d)m (D̃ (d) , d¯) +Q (d)v (d¯) ], ∀d ∈ DKd¯.
∎
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a new exclusion restriction to identify the exponential discount
factor in dynamic discrete choice models. It relies on differences in restriction prob-
abilities. Restriction probabilities describe the probability that agents are restricted
in their choice and cannot choose from all alternatives. The new exclusion restriction
requires two states that exclusively cause different restriction probabilities. These
states are not allowed to cause differences in instantaneous utilities or transition
10Note that if the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives is not fulfilled, it is
sufficient that there exists an alternative d such that d ∈ D̃ (d).
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probabilities. With these conditions, the exponential discount factor is point iden-
tified.
Relative to that in Magnac and Thesmar (2002), this paper presents an exclusion
restriction that is easy to interpret. The exclusion restriction depends exclusively
on instantaneous utilities, transition rates, and restriction probabilities. In contrast
to Abbring and Daljord (2020b), the presented exclusion restriction leads directly to
point identification. As it is only necessary that agents are potentially restricted after
one state-choice combination, most models can be easily adapted to the presented
framework. I discuss two potential avenues for adaptations to models as discussed
in Magnac and Thesmar (2002) or Abbring and Daljord (2020b).
Restriction probabilities can be interpreted to be caused by external factors.
As such external factors might exclusively impact agents’ possibilities to choose
from all alternatives, the presented exclusion restriction might be fulfilled in many
applications. As a result, it might be easier to find variables satisfying the presented
exclusion restriction than those presented in Magnac and Thesmar (2002) or Abbring
and Daljord (2020b).
To point identify β, neither stationarity nor the normalization of the utility of one
alternative is necessary. In the simplest case, economic agents are only potentially
restricted in their choice set after a single state-choice combination. If the exclusion
restriction is fulfilled, a combination of observed choice probabilities leads to point
identification of the discount factor. Identification for other cases is achieved by the
use of genuine choice probabilities, which can be derived from the observed choice
probabilities in almost all possible cases. All derived identification equations are
economically intuitive.
Identification within an infinite- and a finite-horizon model is discussed. It is
shown that for finite-horizon models, time preferences can also be identified for
short panels. Due to the non-stationary nature of the finite-horizon model, point
identification is also possible if there exist two groups with different restriction prob-
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abilities over multiple periods. To identify β in such cases, it is sufficient that this
difference is limited in time.
Many empirical examples are provided for which the presented exclusion restric-
tion is fulfilled. In the labor market, an active labor market policy that temporarily
supports unemployed individuals in finding employment can be exploited for iden-
tification. Such a policy decreases the restriction probability to remain unemployed
by increasing job offer rates. If a comparable group of unemployed individuals is
found that does not receive such support, time preferences can be identified from
differences in the observed choice probabilities of the two groups.
Potential extensions include more than one restricted choice set per alternative.
Identification seems possible in these cases but complicates the recovery of restriction
and genuine choice probabilities. Future research might also derive conditions to
identify parameters of hyperbolic discounting.
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Appendix A: Restriction probabilities
In some cases, restriction probabilities are unknown. For instance, in the context
of labor supply, job offers are rarely observed. In such cases, the researcher has to
disentangle observed choices made due to restrictions and due to preferences. Under
certain circumstances, it is possible to recover the probability of being restricted.
The discussion is reduced to the following setting:
Restriction Probability Assumption 1. All restricted choice sets D̃ (d) with
d ∈ D are known. In particular, depending on the previous period’s choice d and
state x, the researcher knows the available alternatives of each restricted choice set
D̃ (d). Only the probability that forces agents to choose from D̃ (d) is unknown.
The following presents three different sets of additional assumptions; each alone
is sufficient for the identification of all restriction probabilities.
Restriction Probability Assumption Set 1. There exists an alternative d ∈ D
after which agents are not restricted in their choice set, such that π (d, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X .
Let d ∈ D denote an alternative after which choices are not restricted in the sub-
sequent period. Let r ∈ D denote an alternative after which choices are potentially
restricted to the set D̃ (r) ⊂ D. Consider the following observed choice probabilities:
Pr (i′ ∉ D̃ (r) ∣d, x′, x) = GPr (i′ ∣D, x′ ) ,
Pr (i′ ∉ D̃ (r) ∣r, x′, x) = (1 − π (r, x))GPr (i′ ∣D, x′ ) .
Dividing the two equations and rearranging leads to
π (r, x) = 1 − Pr (i′ ∉ D̃ (r) ∣r, x′, x)
Pr (i′ ∉ D̃ (r) ∣d, x′, x) ,
identifying the restriction probability π (r, x). In this manner, and with the help of
the unrestricted choice set after choosing d, it is possible to recover all restriction
probabilities from the data.
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Restriction Probability Assumption Set 2. There exists an alternative d ∈ D,
the subsequent restricted choice set D̃ (d) of which includes only one choice s ∈ D.
The respective restriction probability π (d, x) is known for all states x ∈ X .
Let d ∈ D denote the choice related to a restricted choice set that includes only
one alternative s′ ∈ D̃ (d). The observed choice probability of a choice i′ ≠ s is
Pr (i′ ∉ D̃ (d)∣d, x′, x) = (1 − π (d, x))GPr (i′ ∣D, x′ ) .
Knowing π (d, x) makes it possible to recover GPr (j′ ∣D, x′ ) ∀j′ ∉ D̃ (d). Because
D̃ (d) is a singleton, it is also possible to recover GPr (s′ ∣D, x′ ) for choice s′ ∈ D̃ (d):
GPr (s′ ∣D, x′ ) = 1 − ∑
j′∉D̃(d)
GPr (j′ ∣D, x′ ) with s′ ∈ D̃ (d) .
With the help of the genuine choice probabilities, all other restriction probabil-
ities can be identified using the observed choice probabilities of an alternative not
included in the restricted choice set:
π (k, x) = 1 − Pr (i′ ∉ D̃ (k)∣k, x′, x)
GPr (i′ ∈ D∣D, x′) , ∀k ∉ D̃ (d) .
Restriction Probability Assumption Set 3. Each restricted choice set D̃ (d),
d ∈ D, excludes at least one choice j′ ∈ D that is also excluded in another restricted
choice set. Additionally, at least one restriction probability is known.
The observed choice probability of alternative k′ ∉ D̃ (d) after having selected d
in the previous period is
Pr (k′ ∣d, x′, x) = (1 − π (d, x))GPr (k′ ∣D, x′ ) .
As long as k′ is also excluded in another set D̃ (j) with j ≠ d, it is possible to divide
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the observed choice probabilities for the two choices j and d in the previous period:
Pr (k′ ∣d, x′, x)
Pr (k′ ∣j, x′, x) =
(1 − π (d, x))
(1 − π (j, x)) .
Since it is assumed that one restriction probability is known, it is possible to derive
the restriction probabilities for all choices d ∈ D.
Appendix B: Genuine Choice Probabilities
Lemma 1 states conditions sufficient to identify all genuine choice probabilities from
the observed choice and restriction probabilities.
Lemma 1. Given the data {Pr (d′ ∣d, x′, x) , π (d, x) ;d′, d ∈ D, x′, x ∈ X}, one of the
following conditions is sufficient to uniquely determine the genuine choice probabil-
ities GPr(d′ ∣D̃ (d) , x′ ), for all (d′, x′) ∈ D̃ (d) × X :
1. At least one restriction probability is zero for all states x ∈ X .
2. All alternatives, or all but one, are excluded at least once from one of the
restricted choice sets D̃ (d) with d ∈ D.
3. There exist two identical restricted choice sets (D̃ (l) = D̃ (r)) with different
restriction probabilities (π (l, x) ≠ π (r, x) for all x ∈ X ).
4. The restriction probabilities for alternatives, which are common among all
restricted choice sets, differ across these alternatives.
Proof. The observed choice probabilities have one of these two forms:
Pr (d′ ∣d) = (1 − π (d))GPr (d′ ∣D) if d′ ∉ D̃ (d) (A.15)
or
Pr (d′ ∣d) = (1 − π (d))GPr (d′ ∣D) + π (d)GPr (d′ ∣D̃ (i)) if d′ ∈ D̃ (d) , (A.16)
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where x′ and x are dropped to ease the exposition.
If a genuine choice probability of choosing d′ from the general set is identified, the
respective genuine choice probabilities of choosing d′ from any of the restricted choice
sets are uniquely determined by (A.16). Thus, to prove lemma 1, it is sufficient to
demonstrate the identification of the genuine choice probability when choosing from
the unrestricted choice set D.
Proof of condition 1: The observed choice probabilities after choosing an alterna-
tive without a subsequent restriction are equal to their respective genuine choice
probability of choosing from D.
Proof of condition 2: For an alternative that is at least once excluded from a re-
stricted choice set, there exists an observed choice probability that is takes the form
of (A.15). This directly identifies its genuine choice probability. If one alternative
(d′) is included in all restricted choice sets, its genuine choice probability can be
identified from the genuine choice probabilities of all the other alternatives
GPr (d′ ∣D) = 1 − ∑
l′∈D
GPr (l′ ∣D) .
Thus, for models in which all alternatives but one are at least once excluded from
a restricted choice set, all genuine choice probabilities are identified. Note that this
includes cases in which one restricted choice set is a singleton.
Proof of condition 3: Without the loss of generality, assume that D̃ (j) = D̃ (i) = D̃.
For alternatives included in D̃, the observed choice probabilities are
Pr (d′ ∣j ) = (1 − π (j))GPr (d′ ∣D) + π (j)GPr (d′ ∣D̃ )
Pr (d′ ∣i) = (1 − π (i))GPr (d′ ∣D) + π (i)GPr (d′ ∣D̃ ) .
27
Identification of Time Preferences Ulrich C. Schneider
The two linear equations are independent as long as π (j) ≠ π (i). The genuine
choice probability of each alternative included in D̃ is identified by
GPr (d′ ∣D) = π (j)Pr (d′ ∣i) − π (i)Pr (d′ ∣j )
π (j) − π (i)
For each alternative not included in D̃, an equation in the form of (A.15) exists
that identifies the respective genuine choice probability.
Proof of condition 4: Denote the set of alternatives that are common among all
restricted choice sets by Dˆ = {dˆ1, . . . , dˆNˆ}. Denote the set of alternatives that are
part of D̃ (d) but not common among all sets by Dˇ (d) = {dˇd
1
, . . . , dˇd
Nˇd
}. The following
system of equations can be derived for each d ∈ D:
Pr (dˆ1 ∈ Dˆ ∣d) = (1 − π (d))GPr (dˆ1 ∣D) + π (d)GPr (dˆ1 ∣D̃ (d)) (A.17.1)
...
Pr (dˆNˆ−1 ∈ Dˆ ∣d) = (1 − π (d))GPr (dˆNˆ−1 ∣D) + π (d)GPr (dˆNˆ−1 ∣D̃ (d)) (A.17.N-1)
Pr (dˆNˆ ∈ Dˆ ∣d) = (1 − π (d))
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 − Nˆ−1∑
l=1
GPr (dˆl ∣D) − ∑
j∉Dˆ
GPr (j ∣D)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+ π (d)
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 − Nˆ−1∑
l=1
GPr (dˆl ∣D̃ (d)) − Nˇ
i
∑
l=1
GPr (dˇdl ∣D̃ (d))
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(A.18)
The system consists of Nˆ independent equations. (A.17.1) – (A.17.N-1) feature
two unknowns each: GPr (dˆ ∣D) and GPr (dˆ ∣D̃ (d)). (A.18) does not include any
additional unknowns, as choices not included in D̃ (d) can be directly identified with
an equation similar to (A.15). In total, the system includes 2 (Nˆ − 1) unknowns. An
additional system for a choice k ≠ d only adds Nˆ − 1 unknowns because the genuine
choice probabilities choosing from D are already included in the system of choice
d. Furthermore, each additional system adds Nˆ independent equations as long as
π (k) ≠ π (d). In total, there are (1 + J) (Nˆ − 1) unknowns and JNˆ independent
equations, leading to (J −N + 1) more equations than unknowns. Thus, as long
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as the restriction probabilities differ for alternatives that are common among all
restricted choice sets, all genuine choice probabilities can be recovered.
∎
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